Strategia transferu jako skuteczna metoda resolution - rozważania teoretyczne i wnioski z dotychczasowych doświadczeń

Anna Dobrzańska

doi:10.26354/bb.2.1.98.2025

Published: 2025-05-09

Vol. 98 No. 1 (2025)

Transfer strategy as an effective resolution method - theoretical considerations and lessons learnt so far

Anna Dobrzańska

Section: Problems and Opinions

https://doi.org/10.26354/bb.2.1.98.2025

Abstract

The experience gathered in recent years has shown that the dominant method used in bank resolution is the transfer strategy which involves transfer of all or selected assets and liabilities from the problem bank to the new, market acquirer. The analysis outlined in this article indicates a number of advantages of the transfer strategy compared to the alternative bail-in strategy or a standard insolvency proceedings. In particular, the transfer strategy allows for setting lower requirements in terms of the bank’s internal loss absorbing capacity, which make it particularly suitable for smaller deposit-funded banks. However, the success of a transfer strategy depends on several factors and its implementation requires adequate preparation. The article attempts to outline the most important determinants of a successful transfer strategy.

Keywords:

transfer strategy , bail-in strategy , resolution , crisis management

JEL Codes

G01, G21, G28, H12

Download files

pdf (Język Polski) pdf

Citation rules

Dobrzańska, A. (2025). Transfer strategy as an effective resolution method - theoretical considerations and lessons learnt so far . Safe Bank, 98(1), 34–57. https://doi.org/10.26354/bb.2.1.98.2025

Cited by / Share

Licence

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Most read articles by the same author(s)

Anna Dobrzańska, European crisis management framework in the banking sector – main issues to address , Safe Bank: Vol. 84 No. 3 (2021)
Anna Dobrzańska, Assessment of the EU proposal for resolution of insurance companies – should the IRRD be a copy of the BRRD? , Safe Bank: Vol. 88 No. 3 (2022)
Anna Dobrzańska, Macroprudential Policy in the Time of a Pandemic , Safe Bank: Vol. 81 No. 4 (2020)
Anna Dobrzańska, Towards the enhanced role of deposit guarantee schemes in the European Union crisis management framework , Safe Bank: Vol. 93 No. 4 (2023)
Anna Dobrzańska, Jarosław Michalewicz, Post-crisis Regulations of Systemically Important Banks. The End of the “Too Big to Fail” Doctrine? , Safe Bank: Vol. 66 No. 1 (2017)
Anna Dobrzańska, Macroprudential aspects of CRD IV/CRR , Safe Bank: Vol. 58 No. 1 (2015)
Anna Dobrzańska, W kierunku jednolitego nadzoru bankowego w Unii Europejskiej , Safe Bank: Vol. 49 No. 4 (2012): Bezpieczny Bank
Anna Dobrzańska, Macroprudential committees in the EU – an analysis of institutional arrangements , Safe Bank: Vol. 70 No. 1 (2018)
Anna Dobrańska, Łukasz Kurowski, Countercyclical capital buffer as a macroprudential instrument. Experience gathered so far in the European Union , Safe Bank: Vol. 74 No. 1 (2019)

References

Adrian T., N. Abbas, S. L. Ramirez, G. F. Dionis (2024), The US Banking Sector since the March 2023 Turmoil: Navigating the Aftermath, Global Financial Stability Note, Note 2024/001, International Monetary Fund.
Google Scholar

Baudino P., E. Johnston Ross, B. Van Roosebeke, R. Vrbaski (2023), Bank transfers in resolution – practices and lessons, FSI Insights on policy implementation, No 55, Financial Stability Institute, December.
Google Scholar

BFG (2024), Metodyka MREL.
Google Scholar

Costa N., Van Roosebeke B., Vrbaski R., Walters R. (2022), Counting the cost of payout: constraints for deposit insurers in funding bank failure management, FSI Insights on policy implementation No. 45, Financial Stability Institute, Bank for International Settlements.
Google Scholar

Croitoru O., M. Dobler, J. Molin, Resolution Funding: Who Pays When Financial Institutions Fail? (2018), Technical Notes and Manuals 18/01, International Monetary Fund.
Google Scholar

De Aldisio A., G. Aloia, A. Bentivegna, A. Gagliano, E. Giorgiantonio, C. Lanfranchi, M. Maltese (2019), Towards a framework for orderly liquidation of banks in the EU, Notes on Financial Stability and Supervision, No. 15, Banca d’Italia, August.
Google Scholar

Dobrzańska, A. (2021), Unijne ramy zarządzania kryzysowego w sektorze bankowym – główne problemy do rozwiązania, Bezpieczny Bank, 84(3), 9–42.
Google Scholar

Dobrzańska, A. (2024), W kierunku większej roli systemów gwarancji depozytów w unijnych ramach zarządzania kryzysowego, Bezpieczny Bank, 93(4), 7–30.
Google Scholar

Doubler M., E. Emre, A. Gullo, D. Kale (2020), The Case for Depositor Preference, Technical Notes and Manuals, International Monetary Fund, December.
Google Scholar

Dyrektywa Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2014/59/UE z dnia 15 maja 2014 r. ustanawiająca ramy na potrzeby prowadzenia działań naprawczych oraz restrukturyzacji i uporządkowanej likwidacji w odniesieniu do instytucji kredytowych i firm inwestycyjnych oraz zmieniająca dyrektywę Rady 82/891/EWG i dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2001/24/WE, 2002/47/WE, 2004/25/WE, 2005/56/WE, 2007/36/WE, 2011/35/UE, 2012/30/UE i 2013/36/EU oraz rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1093/2010 i (UE) nr 648/2012, Dz. U. UE L 173/190 z dnia 12.6.2014.
Google Scholar

EBA (2022), Final Report, Guidelines for institutions and resolution authorities to complement the resolvability assessment for transfer strategies (Transferability guidelines), EBA/GL/2022/11.
Google Scholar

EBA (2024), MREL Dashboard, 1Q and 2Q 2024.
Google Scholar

European Commission (2023) Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Report Accompanying the Proposals for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action, Regulation of the European Parliament and Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action, Directive of the European Parliament and Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation and transparency, SWD(2023) 225 final.
Google Scholar

Fed (2023), Review of the Federal Reserve’s Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, April.
Google Scholar

Feldberg G., C. Mott (2023), The 2023 Banking Crisis: Lesson about Bail-in, Yale School of Management.
Google Scholar

FDIC (2017), Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008–2013.
Google Scholar

FDIC (2023a), FDIC’s Supervision of Signature Bank, April.
Google Scholar

FDIC (2023b), Fact Sheet on Proposed Rule to Require Large Banks to Maintain Long-Term Debt to Improve Financial Stability and Resolution.
Google Scholar

FSB (2013), Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on Identification of Critical Functions and Critical Shared Services, July.
Google Scholar

FSB (2023), 2023 Bank Failures, Preliminary lessons learnt for resolution, October.
Google Scholar

FSB (2024), The importance of resolution planning and loss-absorbing capacity for banks systemic in failure, Public Statement.
Google Scholar

Gruenberg M. (2019), An Underappreciated Risk: The Resolution of Large Regional Banks in the United States, speech at The Brookings Institution Center on Regulation and Markets, October 16.
Google Scholar

Michalewicz, J. (2023), Fala kryzysowa w systemach bankowych USA i Szwajcarii w marcu 2023 roku. Bezpieczny Bank, 91(2), 109–140.
Google Scholar

Restoy F., (2023), MREL for sale of business resolution strategies, FSI Briefs No 20, September.
Google Scholar

Restoy F., R. Vrbaski, R. Walters (2020), Bank failure management in the European banking union: What’s wrong and how to fix it, Occasional Paper No 15, Financial Stability Institute, July.
Google Scholar

Ringe, W-G., (2017), Bail-in between Liquidity and Solvency, Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No 33/2016, University of Oxford.
Google Scholar

SRB (2020), Expectation for banks.
Google Scholar

SRB (2021), Operational Guidance for banks on separability for transfer tools.
Google Scholar

SRB (2023), Resolvability of banking union banks: 2022, September.
Google Scholar

SRB (2024a), Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL).
Google Scholar

SRB (2024b), Small and Medium-sized banks: Resolution planning and crisis management for less significant institutions in 2023 and 2024, September.
Google Scholar

SRB (2024c), SRB MREL Dashboard 2Q2024.
Google Scholar

Stopczyński A. (2020), Banki na progu upadłości – refleksje nad postępowaniem, Bank i Kredyt, Vol. 51 No 5.
Google Scholar

Swiss National Bank (2023), Financial Stability Report.
Google Scholar

Szczepańska O., A. Dobrzańska, B. Zdanowicz (2015), Resolution czyli nowe podejście do banków zagrożonych upadłością, NBP.
Google Scholar

Tröger T. H. (2018), Too Complex to Work: A Critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime, SAFE Working Paper No. 179.
Google Scholar

Zhou J., V. Rutledge, W. Bossu, M. Dobler, N. Jassaud, M. Moore (2012), From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions, IMF Staff Discussion Note, SDN/12/03, International Monetary Fund.
Google Scholar

Vol. 98 No. 1 (2025)
Published: 2025-05-09

ISSN: 1429-2939

eISSN: 2544-7068

10.26354

Publisher

Bankowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny

Licence CC

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Submit

-->