Published : 2017-06-15

Post-crisis Regulations of Systemically Important Banks. The End of the “Too Big to Fail” Doctrine?

Anna Dobrzańska



Jarosław Michalewicz



Abstract

The global financial crisis forced public authorities responsible for maintaining financial stability to resolve the issue of too big to fail institutions. Post-crisis reforms directed at systemically important banks have basically two objectives. The first goal is to increase loss-absorbing capacity of such institutions. The second aim is to ensure mechanisms and tools which will enable the public authorities to conduct orderly resolution of systemically important banks when their viability is threatened, while constraining negative consequences for stability of the financial system and the real economy. The purpose of this article is to present and assess regulatory actions taken to address problems related to systemically important banks. The article tries to define such institutions indicating the main criteria which determine their systemic importance. It also indicates reasons for which such institutions create systemic risk. The main analysis is focused on the key reforms, i.e. the additional capital buffers, the orderly resolution and the TLAC requirements.

Keywords:

systemically important banks, G-SIBs, “too big to fail”, capital buffers, resolution, TLAC, Basel III



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Dobrzańska, A. ., & Michalewicz, J. (2017). Post-crisis Regulations of Systemically Important Banks. The End of the “Too Big to Fail” Doctrine?. Safe Bank, 66(1), 32–59. Retrieved from https://ojs.bfg.pl/index.php/bb/article/view/263

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