Safe Bank

This article examines whether the crowding-out of private bank credit by public debt as a manifestation of the sovereign-bank nexus is empirically detectable in three banking systems with distinct institutional models (Poland, Germany, France), and whether the pattern of detectability matches differences in the architecture of public investment support. The analysis uses an unbalanced LSDV panel (N=3; 88 quarterly observations, Q1 2018 - Q2 2025) with country-specific interaction terms and HAC standard errors. The effect is statistically significant in Poland (β̂ = -0.092) and France (β̂ = -0.049) and insignificant in Germany. However, formal coefficient-equality tests do not reject equality across countries (joint test p=0.51), indicating a difference in detectability rather than in magnitude. The findings bear on the resilience of the credit channel and banking-sector stability but, given purposive sampling and N=3, remain hypothesis-generating.

The volume of housing loans relative to GDP indicates the importance of this segment of intermediation in a country's financial system. Properly analyzed, the market features of a given country—when compared with others—allow for an assessment of its level of maturity. At the same time, such an evaluation of the maturity of the housing loan market can roughly serve as an indication of the stability of the financial system in a given country or group of countries. Research on the characteristics and patterns of the maturation processes of housing loan markets in different countries is relatively scarce and methodologically challenging (among other things, due to heterogeneity). 

The goal of the article is to analyze and quantify the maturity level of the housing loan market in 19 European Union countries. The analysis of the collected data used the TOPSIS technique, designed for a synthetic assessment of multi-criteria processes in the form of linear ranking of objects. Nine selected diagnostic indicators of the studied markets were analyzed. The diagnostic indicators of the examined markets and the results were used to create a ranking. Meanwhile, the indicators of basic features and the synthetic market maturity indicators were used to group the studied countries. The conducted analysis shows a clear segmentation of the mortgage markets in the examined EU countries according to the applied criteria and indicators, and thus provides evidence that the process of convergence of housing finance models in the European Union remains unfinished, while historical and institutional differences still significantly affect the development level of these markets. The highest positions were taken by Northern and Western European countries, characterized by a deep market, developed refinancing mechanisms based on covered bonds, relatively stable price conditions, and a significant share of fixed-rate loans. This pattern of results indicates that the maturity of the mortgage market is associated not only with the level of mortgage debt, but also with the durability of funding sources, the level of capital market development. At the bottom of the ranking were Hungary, Poland, Romania, Greece, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic.

This article will analyse one of the positions that appears to be the most dangerous from the point of view of the functioning of the financial market, a position which is unfortunately presented in case law , according to which it is the duty of an investment fund company, when outsourcing activities to a third party (i.e. when using an outsourcing agreement), to ensure effective ongoing supervision of the third party. This position was expressed by the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 18 April 2024 (reference number: VI SA/Wa 8336/22) and, although it is a contra legem position, it creates a very serious risk for all financial institutions that use outsourcing agreements. This risk is all the greater that the above-mentioned position of the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw is a consequence of the adoption by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) – and subsequently by the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw – of a legislative interpretation of the provision of Article 45a(4a) of the Act on Investment Funds and Alternative Investment Fund Management, according to which the ongoing supervision of a company is to be effective supervision.

This position – although the analysis contained in this article will concern the interpretation of the provision of Article 45a(4a) of the Act on Investment Funds and Management of Alternative Investment Funds – seems to be of fundamental importance for domestic banks. It is worth recalling that, pursuant to Article 6c(1)(2) of the Banking Law Act of 27 August 1997, one of the necessary conditions for outsourcing banking activities is that: it does not adversely affect the bank's operations in accordance with the law, prudent and stable management of the bank, the effectiveness of the internal control system in the bank, the ability of a certified auditor authorised to audit financial statements or certify the bank's sustainable development reporting on the basis of an agreement concluded with the bank to perform their duties, and the protection of legally protected secrets. One of the necessary conditions for the above-mentioned outsourcing under the Banking Law Act of 27 August 1997 is therefore only possible if the bank ensures access to data related to the entrusted activities or functions. A hypothetical assumption – contrary to the wording of Article 6c(1)(2) of the Banking Law Act of 27 August 1997 – that this access is to be effective, and thus a hypothetical assumption by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority that, for example, the bank's management board is to be given access to the bank's internal control system, would be contrary to the provisions of the Banking Law Act of 27 August 1997. 1(2) of the Banking Law Act of 27 August 1997 – that this access is to be effective, and thus the hypothetical assumption by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority that, for example, the deliberate concealment of certain data by this entity is an administrative offence committed by the bank, would imply the administrative liability of that bank. The consequence of the latter would be that the bank would bear administrative liability for an action over which it had no influence and could not have had any influence in general, which would be in clear opposition to the principles of administrative liability, such as, for example, the principle of specificity of administrative offences, the principle of the objective nature of administrative liability and the principle of the individual nature of liability. This would consequently lead to banks being reluctant to enter into outsourcing agreements, as such agreements would involve too great a risk of administrative liability, which would be enforced in the form of vicarious liability.

The purpose of this article is to provide a doctrinal reference to the position of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority and the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw on the obligation to ensure effective supervision by a financial institution which is an outsourcer, and to demonstrate that this position is contra legem and generates very serious risks. The article will also demonstrate that the position taken by the KNF and the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw is in clear opposition to the principles of administrative responsibility.

The article explains forced intermediation in digital banking and examines its consequences for the security and autonomy of older customers. It uses a critical analysis of research literature, payment-services and accessibility law, and institutional documents. The paper introduces the original concept of forced intermediation, five diagnostic criteria and a four-level scale of third-party involvement. It distinguishes technical authentication, consent to a transaction and the customer’s actual agency, assessed through their understanding of the transaction, freedom of decision and ability to verify the outcome. On this basis, the article develops a framework for supported use of banking services and outlines a possible two-stage implementation in Poland: a sectoral standard defining a separate role and profile for the assistant, followed, where necessary, by statutory clarification of access to information, liability and audit-trail requirements. The model distinguishes technical assistance from a power of attorney and leaves the decision and final approval of the transaction with the customer.

The aim of this study is to characterize the concept referred to in sociology as moral panic, its components, and the use of its structural framework to analyze emotions and disputes with banks regarding mortgage agreements for housing purchases expressed in Swiss francs (CHF) or denominated in that currency. In particular, it concerns the manifestations of moral panic in the context of the role of social media—as an accelerator of stakeholders' emotions and their impact on the stability of banking sector entities. The main method used in this study is literature analysis, mainly within the theoretical framework of Cohen and Garland, complemented by synthetic case analyses of two banks and the Polish banking sector in the context of the Swiss franc loan problem. The discussion demonstrates that banking panic can spread in a 'contagious' manner and be accelerated by the media, particularly social media, shaping on one hand a decidedly negative image of lenders (called, e.g. banksters) and, on the other hand, generalizing the grievances of borrowers by giving them the role of victims. A large-scale moral panic regarding the banking sector also creates social pressure on politicians and decision-makers to change regulations. The Swiss franc loan crisis in Poland is an example of turning a dispute between credit contract parties into a moral crusade with lasting institutional effects, and a side effect can be the destabilization of the system or isolated cases of liquidity loss leading gradually to insolvency. Experiences and potential consequences of moral panic in the financial sector should serve as a reason to build frameworks for managing this phenomenon and, above all, for effective financial education of society.