Safe Bank

The article focuses on the problem of assessment of the effectiveness anD efficiency of countercyclical macroprudential policy. It presents basic sources of procyclicality of the financial sector and analyses objectives of countercyclical  macroprudential policy. The effectiveness of macroprudential policy concerns the degree to which market failures can be addressed and intermediate and final objectives can be achieved. An analysis of contemporary literature in search of methods which could be applied to assess the degree to which the objectives of macroprudential policy are achieved leads us to the conclusion that the current state of knowledge in this area is insufficient. In the same vein, we know very little about the efficiency of countercyclical macroprudential policy, because
available studies focus on a few indirect macroeconomic costs and benefits of more restrictive capital adequacy and liquidity standards, estimated as output losses and gains. Macroprudential regulations, in particular those that are countercyclical, are essential to safeguarding financial stability, which is a prerequisite for stable economic growth and social welfare. However, the analysis conducted in this paper leads to the conclusion that we need further research, with the aim of developing a robust framework of assessment of these regulations. The research should also attempt to design a reliable framework of assessment of the efficiency of macroprudential policy.

The article focuses on the analysis of countercyclical macroprudential instruments directed at the real estate market, with the aim of identification of potential side effects of their use. To achieve this goal we present the most important features of these tools and characterize the transmission mechanism of those instruments. An analysis of the transmission mechanism and related current literature on the pricing of the loan market, as well as side effects of the regulations, lends support to the view that it is possible to identify limitations of this transmission mechanism. We find that restricitve sectoral capital requirements and LTV, DTI and DSTI ratios, may result in increased migration of borrowers to shadow banks or other financial intermediaries (e.g. those operating cross-border), which are not subject to macroprudential regulations. Restrictive macroprudential tools applied to the banking sector could possibly bring about the unintended consequence of increased negative selection and, in effect, of a worsened quality of bank lending portfoli

Financial stability has become one of the main objectives of banking regulation. At first glance it is associated with the norms of the public banking law, what was also easily observed in the progress of the financial reform of supervisory and prudential requirements for the banking sector. However, due to the negative experiences of the recent financial crisis, financial stability has also become an
important prerequisite for the recast of the European legal framework of financial services. The following article, based on case studies from international contractual practice, aims to elaborate on the theoretical as well as practical aspects of the banker-customer relationship, i.e. their role in financial stability and formation of a banking crisis

In the process of risk management in banks, the following are very important:regulatory solutions, defining standards for risk measurement and proper development of the capital base. In transition countries, regulatory changes usually occur gradually, in such a way that their pace and scope are adjusted to structural reforms, but sometimes radically. The objectives of this article are to systematize the process of change of the most important prudential norms in the Polish banking system in the years 1989–2014, just before the introduction of internal regulations implementing the Basel III Capital Accord, and an attempt to answer the question
what was the impact of tightening regulatory standards and the impact of certain negative external factors on the safety of commercial banks in Poland.

The Bank Guarantee Fund operates a unique database regarding the financialsector. The uniqueness of this is due to fullfilement of public functions referred to in the Act on the Bank Guarantee Fund. In the private sector, the following are obliged to transmit information: banks, credit unions, bank receiverships or entities entitled to their representation, trustees in bankruptcy, the National Credit Union, a liquidator of credit unions, a cooperative bank, a community bank. Public entities transmitting information to the BFG include: the Financial Supervision Authority, the President of the National Bank of Poland, the Minister of Finance and the
Supreme Chamber of Control. Beyond that, the Fund may receive information from entities responsible for officially recognised deposit-guarantee schemes in Member States of the EEA and the EU

The paper describes the financing of reimbursement of guaranted deposits in deposit guarantee systems, in particular, issues related to models of calculating deposit premiums. The main objective of the research is an empirical evaluation of the merits of differentiating deposit guarantee premiums in the Polish banking sector, in the context of fairness and effectiveness of spreading the insurance payments. In the theoretical part, the models of calculating deposit premiums have been analyzed, including the risk-adjusted premiums. Also research has been carried out on the use of selected theoretical models of deposit premiums, which enables an assessment of which models take into account more precisely bank risk in Poland.

In the research article I analyze the effects of competition from Polish credit unions on the stability of cooperative banks. I make use of the addresses of all bank and credit union outlets in order to accurately reflect competitors’ strength in local markets. The results prove that credit unions, which until recently stayed outside the official financial supervision, constituted unwanted competition from the perspective of the banking system stability. Cooperative banks that faced the strongest competition from credit unions generated significantly higher loan loss provisions. This result should be related to a comparatively loose credit policy of those banks, and – in turn – taking higher credit risk negatively impacts the stability of these banks. Unwanted competition effects were also observed at the level of the cooperative banks’ net interest margin and their profitability. On the other hand, the results do not confirm a comparable negative influence of competition from other banks.