Safe Bank

The paper analyses the financial condition of Nordic banks in the period of the global financial crisis of 2007–2011. The condition of the Nordic banks compared favourably with large banks domiciled in other parts of Europe. It seems that the basis for their current balanced policy (prudent capital and liquidity management) to a large extent resulted from the difficult experience of the Nordic banking crisis of 1990–1993.

The genesis of the global financial crisis should be sought a few years before its first symptoms occurred in 2007. The development of the world (and Polish) economy was stable until then. The breakdown of American mortgage loans, and later the fall of Lehman Brothers, started a chain of events leading to the global financial breakdown. The Polish economy experienced this as well but the crisis shook the domestic banking system in particular.

Despite a relatively weaker shock in comparison to other countries, the
ownership structure of the Polish banking sector, combined with the crisis of confidence, caused liquidity situation disturbances. The article focuses on the reasons of disturbances of Polish banks issue potential, the progress of the crisis situation emphasizing the antypical liquidity conditions and the activity of the NBP in confronting the destabilization (including open market policy). The summary attempts to assess the Polish central bank’s actions regarding control of Polish banking sector liquidity.

In the paper the author analyzes the functioning of deposit guarantee schemes in EU countries during the financial crisis. It turns out that the hitherto fragmented net of unharmonized national DGSs has many flaws and has resulted in suboptimal, uncoordinated cooperation during the crisis. Such a solution fails to contribute to financial stability on the EU-level. One solution includes creating a pan-European DGS, as a third pillar of the banking union. A single DGS has potentially numerous advantages over a net of national DGSs. However, its construction has to be gradual and the base on increased harmonization of national DGSs.

The process of creation of the key European Union regulations on deposit insurance has had several steps. One of them was the process of deposit coverage harmonization. However, at the same time, related elements of the schemes such as methods and options for funding, remained unchanged. The unprecedented increase of guarantee coverage in response to the financial crisis was aimed at strengthening the protection of depositors, increasing confidence and limiting the possibility of bank runs. However the unification of coverage levels in European countries has not been accompanied by the introduction of systemic changes influencing the actual ability of the scheme to meet its commitments. Because of the lack of coordination, deposit guarantee schemes are currently considered as the most heterogeneous element of the financial safety net in the European Union. Schemes require systemic changes not only in the area of deposit coverage but also in areas where consensus is more difficult to achieve, such as funding. The nominal increase of coverage levels needs to be accompanied by the respective financial capability of the systems to be an effective tool, able to reimburse covered deposits.

A key area of concern for banking supervisors is solvency of banking institutions, which determines the stability of the entire banking sector. In the common opinion of regulators, equity capital is the best protection against unexpected losses. The main proponent of this approach has been for many years the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The evolution of the Basel agreements is aimed at improving the protection against increasing forms of risk, yet in the common opinion, credit risk still plays a dominant role. At the moment there are two main methods for estimating the capital requirement for credit risk, known as the Standard Approach
and the Internal Ratings Approach. The Standard Approach is simple, intuitive and consequently does not require detailed explanations. The Internal Rating Based Approach, on the other hand, is based on a complex mathematical formula, comprehensible only to a very small group of specialists. The purpose of this paper is to explain the basic assumptions of the IRB framework. This explanation has been simplified as much as possible. Detailed mathematical and statistical proofs are replaced with an intuitive explanation, referring to the typical experience of bankers.

The IRB formula framework is actually modified by the banking regulations and adapted to various types of credit exposures. The general assumptions, however, remain unchanged. Understanding the main objectives of the IRB formula opens up further discussion on its relevance to the measurement of actual exposure to credit risk.

The article touches upon the issues of bank liquidity risk management in the wake of the recent financial crisis and the forthcoming regulatory challenges concerning liquidity risk. The complicated nature of liquidity risk is presented in the paper and an attempt is made to indicate the sources of liquidity risk, highlighting the interlinkages between them.

Awareness of the scale of financial exclusion and over-indebtedness and, above all, of the negative consequences of what they involve on a micro-economic scale for individual households, as well as on a macro-economic scale for the whole national economy is not reflected in considerations on the basis of identification of the interdependencies and concomitance of both phenomena. The purpose of this article is to indicate relationships between the phenomenon of over-indebtedness and financial exclusion, especially banking exclusion. In particular, this paper will explore the size of household debt and financial exclusion in Poland, and then the recognition of the causes and consequences of both phenomena with an identification of the common areas. An examination of the socioeconomic profiles of people facing over-indebtedness and those facing financial exclusion and an analysis of the whole process of households becoming over-indebted or financially excluded shows that these two terms are closely related and strongly interact with other.