Safe Bank

The FSB’s proposal on Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) constitutes the last major building block of the post-crisis regulatory reform agenda for global financial markets. The proposal aims at creating the preconditions for an orderly liquidation of complex banking institutions that would ensure the continuation of critical financial services without the need to use taxpayers’ money in the
resolution. The FSB’s proposals are fundamentally conducive to achieving these aims. However, the TLAC proposal will have considerable side-effects on the organisational structure and competitiveness of cross-border banking groups; specifically, it is likely to disadvantage banking groups with material foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, while the TLAC proposal provides a comprehensive
framework concerning capital requirements for too-big-to-fail institutions, the treatment of other aspects which influence systemic stability, e.g. liquidity and rollover risk, are underdeveloped.

During the recent financial crises, the cost of the aid provided to banks was mostly borne by taxpayers. This resulted in increased budget deficits and bred moral hazard among banks. The latest reforms introduce regulatory requirements and legal provisions, which in the first place put the burden of the costs related to the bank crisis on institutional shareholders and creditors. The Financial
Stability Board has proposed a standard for the total loss-absorbing capacity of banks (TLAC). In the European context, the equivalent of this requirement is the minimum relevant level of own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). Both standards require that banks maintain an appropriate value of liabilities that, in the event of a crisis, can be converted into capital and used to cover losses.
This article describes the new requirements, pointing out the similarities and differences between them. The paper also presents reflections on the practical aspects of the implementation of TLAC and MREL, with particular emphasis on the perspective of the domestic financial system.

The recent financial crisis had a turbulent onset when professional institutional investors decided to withdraw their funding from banks, sparked by fear of credit losses and unmanageable capital requirements in, most notably, the investment
portfolios of these banks.
In recent years regulators developed a comprehensive set of reform measures aiming to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, improve risk management and governance, strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures.
At the same time, steps were taken to better prepare for the event of a gone concern situation: recovery plans and resolution plans were drafted by banks and regulators respectively. For G-SIBs, on top of these plans, additional loss absorbing capacity is needed to ensure that, in case of a default, these financial institutions can be resolved in an orderly manner without taxpayer support.
The purpose of this article is to present recent regulatory initiatives in the field of loss-absorbing capital buffers and their impact on banks’ capital structure and cost of financing.

Several reflections and suggestions concerning the planned regulations aimedat limiting moral hazard done by TBTF banks were presented in this article. The scope of reflection is mainly the effectiveness of implementation of a resolution regime. To allow effective implementation of the resolution process probably the TLAC (Total Loss Absorbing Capacity) mechanism will be used. The mechanism will, according to the author, probably start the division of TBTF banks due to additional capital restrictions. If the division mechanism of two banks from the G-SIB group were to start it would be enough to be moderately optimistic when it
comes to limiting moral hazard in banking.

As a result of the crisis of confidence in the financial markets caused by events that took place in the years 2007-2008 and later fiscal problems in the peripheral countries of the European Union, banks lost their ability of refinancing based on unsecured interbank deposits. This contributed to the growth of the importance of deposits from non-financial customers whose cost started differing significantly from money market indices based on the interbank market. Moreover, strong divergence between the rate applicable to off-balance-sheet items (OIS) and the price of cash applicable to balance-sheet flows appeared. This article presents an analysis of changes in the structure of interest rates in various segments of the market in four selected countries of the EU: two countries from the Eurozone and two non-Eurozone countries. Observations from the money market indicate that it is economically justified to create separate benchmarks for balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet items.