Publications
Adequacy of loss-absorbing capacity of global systemically important banks in resolution, Consultative Document, FSB, 10 November 2014.
Admati A.R., DeMarzo P.M., Hellwig M.F., Pfleiderer P., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper 86, 2011.
Bańbuła P., Polityka makroostrożnościowa: przesłanki, cele, instrumenty i wyzwania, NBP, Materiały i Studia nr 283, 2013.
European Covered Bond Fact Book, ECBC, 2014.
EU loss-absorbing capacity requirement: final MREL guidelines, BBVA, 7 July 2015.
Fiechter J., Otker-Robe I., Ilyina A., Hau M., Santos A., Surti J., Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit All?, IMF Staff Discussion Note, 7 March 2011: chapter II).
Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April, 2014.
Gracie A., Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity – the thinking behind the FSB Term Sheet, BoE, Citi European Credit Conference, December 2014.
Haldane A.G., Banking on the state, BIS, BIS Review 139/2009.
How A Bail-In Tool Could Affect Our Ratings On EU Banks, S&P, 2012, May 10.
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, FSB, October 2014.
Laeven L., Valencia F., Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, in Financial Crises: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses, IMF, 2014.
Marsh A., Covered Bond Bail-in Benefit Prompts Moody’s Ratings Proposal, 2013.
Pawłowicz L., Hazard moralny w finansach i bankowości, „Sektor bankowy w Europie. Co zmienił kryzys?”, Zeszyty BRE Bank – CASE Nr 126/2013.
Stolz P., Wedow M., Extraordinary Measures in Extraordinary Times: Public Measures of Support of the Financial Sector in the EU and the United States, European Central Bank Occasional Paper No. 117, Frankfurt, 2010.
Ten key points from the FSB’s TLAC ratio, PwC, November 2014.
Thematic Review on Resolution Regimes-Peer Review Report, FSB, April 2013.
Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC): making bail-in feasible and credible instead of bail-out, BBVA, November 2014, p. 5.
Tsesmelidakis Z., Merton R., The Value of Implicit Guarantees, IMF Working Paper No. 12/128, 2012.
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions, 2014/0020 (COD).
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2013/0253 (COD)
European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing
framework for the needs of running recovery and reorganization and resolution
activities with reference to credit institutions and investment companies and
amending the Council Directive 82/891/EEC and European Parliament and Council
Directive 2001/24/WE, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/
EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU and the Regulation of the European Parliament and
Council (EU) No. 1093/2010 and (UE) No. 648/2012, Official Gazette EU 2014 L 173.
EBA Final Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on criteria for determining the
minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities under Directive 2014/59/
EU, (EBA/RTS/2015/05).
Internet resources:
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=71390
http://european-economy.e