Safe Bank

This paper focuses on monetary policy transparency. Central banks’ practice in the field of communication, especially while signalling their intentions, is not reflected in most known transparency measures. The following paper presents a comparison of the best-known transparency indices and offers an extension to them that focuses on the forward-lookingness of the central bank. A more elaborate approach to signalling intentions is not covered by transparency measures developed in the pre-crisis period. Thus the purpose of this paper is methodological: developing extended transparency measures. Additionally, the application of these extensions is presented. The empirical part of the research covers the Czech Republic and Poland.

This paper aims to identify the role of bank size for the sensitivity of leverage and liquidity funding risk to their determinants (both bank-specific and macroeconomic). Applying the two-step robust GMM estimator to individual bank data from over 60 countries covering the period 2000–2011 our study shows that increases in previous period funding liquidity risk are associated with increases in leverage in the full sample and in large banks, but not in other banks. The liquidity of large banks tends also to increase with leverage levels. With reference to the impact of macroeconomic conditions on leverage of banks we find that leverage of large banks is the most procyclical during a crisis period. Liquidity risk is procyclical during non-crisis periods. However, during a crisis period this liquidity risk is countercyclical, consistent with the view that even slight improvements in  macroeconomic environment do not stimulate banks to increase their exposure to this risk. Such effect is particularly strong in the case of large banks. Generally, such counter-cyclicality of liquidity risk of large banks may result in weaker access to the bank financing necessary to stimulate investments in the real economy during a crisis period. This may have further negative consequences for the real economy, generating an extended period of sluggish economic growth.

Following the default of Lehman Brothers, governments around the world had to mobilise enormous rescue packages to cope with widespread financial panic. In these efforts a fundamental flaw in the international financial architecture became apparent, namely the inability of national supervisors to orchestrate orderly bank resolutions across borders. Since then, the international regulatory community has made efforts in devising the best approach to resolving large and cross-border banking groups. This article presents reflections on the recent regulatory initiatives in the field of loss-absorbing capital buffers and temporary funding needed to support the orderly resolution of a global systemically important bank (“G-SIB”).

The paper aims to analyse the role of green banking in organising a sustainable industrial network. The main hypothesis of the paper is that the green bank works to mobilise other industrial actors to undertake activities and devote resources to implement network strategies of sustainable development. The main contribution of the paper is the proposition of integrating network analysis into the complex structure of green banking system interactions and relationships with the industrial system, which aim at eco-development into a coherent industrial ecosystem. The conceptualisation of a green banking network using the industrial network approach is configured to address explicit environmental and social issues. The main assumption of the sustainability network model is that the relationships of banks with stakeholders (i.e. suppliers, employers and customers) are based on mutual benefit and sustainability outcomes.

Interest in reputational risk as a self-standing type of risk is relatively new. The research is driven not so much by regulatory requirements, but by stakeholders’ interest. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to trace the sources of reputational risk and consequences of the problems associated with a bank’s negative reputation. The paper focuses on the differences in the definitions and methodological problems of its measurement. The empirical part proposes a new index measuring reputational risk, based on the perspectives of important stakeholders. The panel models analyse the impact of the index on bank performance in CEE.

This article presents the position of the European Financial Congress in relation to the European Commission’s consultation document on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate. From 9th June till 20th September 2016, the EC ran a public consultation on the evaluation of the financial conglomerate directive (FICOD), whether it delivers on its objective to identify and manage group risks, i.e. multiple gearing, excessive leveraging of capital, contagion, complexity management, concentration and conflict of interest. Financial conglomerates were originally represented by bancassurance. Over time financial institutions have expanded into investment banking, asset management and other financial activities, with separate segment supervisions. Now, they are getting bigger, more complex and international, expanding into the real economy, outsourcing critical processes to non-regulated external offshore companies. Moreover, manufacturing companies are developing competencies in banking area and traditional financial institutions are being challenged by expanding fintech projects. The evaluation of supplementary supervision shall lead to better regulation in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and added value. As a result, the legislation shall contribute to enhanced financial stability, safeguard creditors’ and policyholders’ interests, and promote the competitiveness of financial conglomerates within the EU and at international level. From the Polish perspective, FICOD shall protect the financial system from the import of group risks and lead to secure growth of local financial conglomerates, enjoying a level playing field in the EU. The EC consultation paper was addressed by representatives of different groups of stakeholders in the Polish financial market, including in particular: universal banks, auto loan companies, insurance undertakings, regulatory bodies, consulting firms and academia.