Published : 2020-12-29

Legal and Structural Challenges in Implementing BRR Directive to National Law with Regard to Bail-in Mechanism

Abstract

In order to restore public confidence in financial market entities and protect the stability of the financial system after the global financial crisis, public authorities have been equipped with new prerogatives to prevent and counteract systemic threats caused by disorderly bankruptcies of large financial institutions, while minimizing the recourse to public funds. The power to bail-in creditors in the public interest when the bank is failing or likely to fail emerges as the furthest reaching one among them. Following the adoption of the BRR directive, however, in most crisis cases in the banking sector, resolution authorities haven’t used the bail-in tool, even though circumstances allowed for the possibility to ascribe losses to debt instruments not classified as regulatory capital. This paper studies the potential low propensity to use the bail-in mechanism with a view to structural and legal conditions related to the claims hierarchy in bankruptcy proceedings and the interplay between the pari passu and ‘no creditor worse off’ principles.

Keywords:

financial stability, resolution, banking regulation, bail-in

JEL Codes

G01, G18, G21


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Borsuk, M., & Klupa, K. (2020). Legal and Structural Challenges in Implementing BRR Directive to National Law with Regard to Bail-in Mechanism. Safe Bank, 81(4), 56–77. https://doi.org/10.26354/bb.3.4.81.2020

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