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Safe Bank

Published: 2026-10-30

The Architecture of Development Finance Institutions and the Sovereign-Bank Nexus

Marcin Bogusz Logo ORCID
Section: Problems and Opinions
https://doi.org/10.26354/bb.1.2.103.2026

A Comparative Study of Poland, Germany and France

Abstract

This article examines whether the crowding-out of private bank credit by public debt as a manifestation of the sovereign-bank nexus is empirically detectable in three banking systems with distinct institutional models (Poland, Germany, France), and whether the pattern of detectability matches differences in the architecture of public investment support. The analysis uses an unbalanced LSDV panel (N=3; 88 quarterly observations, Q1 2018 - Q2 2025) with country-specific interaction terms and HAC standard errors. The effect is statistically significant in Poland (β̂ = -0.092) and France (β̂ = -0.049) and insignificant in Germany. However, formal coefficient-equality tests do not reject equality across countries (joint test p=0.51), indicating a difference in detectability rather than in magnitude. The findings bear on the resilience of the credit channel and banking-sector stability but, given purposive sampling and N=3, remain hypothesis-generating.

JEL Codes

E51, G21, G28, H63, H81

Citation rules

Bogusz, M. (2026). The Architecture of Development Finance Institutions and the Sovereign-Bank Nexus: A Comparative Study of Poland, Germany and France. Safe Bank, 103(2), 6–23. https://doi.org/10.26354/bb.1.2.103.2026

Cited by / Share

Vol. 103 No. 2 (2026)
Published: 2026-10-30


ISSN: 1429-2939
eISSN: 2544-7068
Ikona DOI 10.26354

Publisher
Bankowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny

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