Safe Bank

Abstract

This study examines changes in European regulation, particularly the way economic regulations have been proposed and implemented – with a particular focus on financial markets – since the introduction of the Lamfalussy architecture and the proposals of the de Larosière Group. It also offers proposals for addressing future challenges. Market fragmentation within the EU, national protectionism, and divergent supervision hinder the effective functioning of the single financial market. Europe needs massive private investment to increase competitiveness, defense potential, and technological leadership. This requires, among other things, integrated capital markets and profound legislative changes. This includes a shift from directives to regulations and an increased role for EU agencies (e.g., ESMA, EBA, EIOPA) in creating and implementing European law. Furthermore, the growth of cross-border financial interconnections requires centralized supervision, which could reduce transaction costs and increase the efficiency of law enforcement. Unfortunately, the supervisory functions of EU agencies are limited by national supervisory structures and the dominance of the home country principle. However, member states fear a loss of sovereignty, and critics of centralization invoke the Meroni Doctrine, arguing that the EU lacks treaty-based powers over prudential supervision. Hence, the growing role of EU agencies in the legislative process raises questions about their legitimacy and democratic oversight.