Koniecznośc uzyskania potwierdzeń bankowych na potrzeby badania sprawozdania finansowego na przykładzie działalności TPA Wirecard

Edgar Löw

doi:10.26354/bb.6.3.100.2025

Published : 2025-11-05

Vol. 100 No. 3 (2025)

The Problem of Bank Confirmations for the Audit of Financial Statements: The Example of TPA Wirecard's Operations

Edgar Löw

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5818-3741

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26354/bb.6.3.100.2025

Abstract

The Wirecard case was the largest economic scandal in Europe since the Second World War. Thousands of bondholders and shareholders lost their money, and lawsuits were filed against Wirecard, the regulators, the management board, and the auditor Ernst & Young (EY). EY audited Wirecard's consolidated financial statements for ten years. The fraud at Wirecard took place in Asia through business activities with so-called third-party acquirers (TPAs). The scandal resulted in cash funds amounting to 1.9 billion Euros not being available. These funds were allegedly held in escrow accounts. This article shows which audit procedures had to be performed to ensure that the cash funds reported in the balance sheet were actually available. There has been a whole series of alarm signals from outside Wirecard with high relevance for the orientation of the risk-oriented audit approach by the auditor. In addition, Wirecard had numerous indicators of fraud listed in one of the auditing standards. However, this did not have a sufficient impact on EY's risk-based audit approach. On the contrary, the company often relied on Wirecard's verbal statements. Had the audit been conducted properly, the fraud could have been uncovered very quickly. The following article uncovers massive deficiencies in the audit procedures with regard to the escrow accounts. Given the business activity in the TPA business with only three business partners, the dubious nature of the trustee, the involvement of only one bank where the escrow accounts were held, and the paramount importance of the amounts for Wirecard's going concern, it was imperative that the auditor obtain proof of the existence of the cash via a bank confirmation. If the auditor's report had been refused regarding the TPA business at an early stage, which would have been the inevitable consequence if the audit had been carried out properly, the negative financial effects for bondholders and shareholders would have been significantly reduced.

Keywords:

Wirecard, Ernst & Young (EY), auditor, accounting scandal, escrow account, risk-oriented audit approach, fundamental principles of proper audit

JEL Codes

M40, M41, M42, O16

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Löw, E. (2025). The Problem of Bank Confirmations for the Audit of Financial Statements: The Example of TPA Wirecard’s Operations. Safe Bank, 100(3), 93–121. https://doi.org/10.26354/bb.6.3.100.2025

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