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Przedkryzysowa architektura nadzorczo-regulacyjna w USA jako katalizator kryzysu subprime
Artur Mika
Abstract
The aim of this article is to identify and analyze major weaknesses of the precrisis supervisory and regulatory architecture of the U.S. financial market. The main thesis emerging is that weakening the role of this architecture since 1970s has translated into a significant catalyst of the world financial crisis of 2007+. The article is divided into 4 sections. Section 1 focuses on the problem of dispersion of supervisory institutions (as well as inefficiencies of their coordination) and on the issue of regulatory outsourcing. The next section concerns the process of successive erosion of standards in the U.S. banks’ credit policy, resulting from deregulation of the financial market. Both arguments for and against the deregulation are presented. Section 3 presents the phenomenon of the U.S. “revolving door”, which pertains to conflicts of interests in functioning of the regulators and supervisors. Last, but not least, in
section 4 the reader may find implications for financial market regulation and supervision resulting from the model of financing political campaigns.
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