Acharya, V.V. (2009): “A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation.” Journal of Financial Stability, 5(3), 224–255.
Acharya, V.V. and Yorulmazer, T. (2007): “Too many to fail–an analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies.” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16(1), 1–31.
Acharya, V.V. and Yorulmazer, T. (2008): “Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures.” Review of Financial Studies, 21(6), 2705–2742.
Beltratti, A. and Stulz, R.M. (2009): “Why did some banks perform better during the credit crisis? a cross-country study of the impact of governance and regulation.”
NBER Working Papers 15180, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Black, L.K. and Hazelwood, L.N. (2012): “The effect of tarp on bank risk-taking.” Journal of Financial Stability, (forthcoming).
Brown, C.O. and Dinç, I.S. (2005): “The politics of bank failures: Evidence from emerging markets.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4), 1413–1444.
Brown, C.O. and Dinç, I.S. (2011): “Too many to fail? evidence of regulatory forbearance when the banking sector is weak.” Review of Financial Studies, 24(4), 1378–1405.
Caballero, R.J., Hoshi, T. and Kashyap, A.K. (2008): “Zombie lending and depressed restructuring in japan.” American Economic Review, 98(5), 1943–77.
Dam, L. and Koetter, M. (2012): “Bank bailouts and moral hazard: Evidence from germany.” Review of Financial Studies.
Dell’Ariccia, G., Detragiache, E. and Rajan, R. (2008): “The real effect of banking crises.” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 17(1), 89–112.
Dell’Ariccia, G. and Marquez, R. (2006): “Lending booms and lending standards.” Journal of Finance, 61(5), 2511–2546.
DeYoung, R., Kowalik, M. and Reidhill, J. (2013): “A theory of failed bank resolution: Technological change and political economics.” Journal of Financial Stability, forthcoming.
Fortin, R., Goldberg, G.M. and Roth, G. (2010): “Bank risk taking at the onset of the current banking crisis.” The Financial Review, 45(4), 891–913.
Giannetti, M. and Simonov, A. (2011): “On the real effects of bank bailouts: Microevidence from japan.” CEPR Discussion Papers 7441, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Honohan, P. and Klingebiel, D. (2003): “The fiscal cost implications of an accommodating approach to banking crises.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(8), 1539–1560.
Igan, D.O. and Tamirisa, N.T. (2008): “Are weak banks leading credit booms? evidence from emerging europe.” Comparative Economic Studies, 50(4), 599–619.
Imai, M. (2009): “Political influence and declarations of bank insolvency in japan.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(1), 131–158.
Kane, E.J. (1990): “Principal-agent problems in s&l salvage.” Journal of Finance, 45(3), 755–764.
Kane, E.J. (2002): “Resolving systemic financial crises efficiently.” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 10(3), 217–226.
Kasa, K. and Spiegel, M.M. (2008): “The role of relative performance in bank closure decisions.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, 17–29.
Korte, J. (2013): “Catharsis – the real effects of bank insolvency and resolution.” June 2013, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No 21/2013.
La Porta, R., López-de Silanes, F. and Zamarripa, G. (2003): “Related lending.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 231–268.
Mailath, G.J. and Mester, L.J. (1994): “A positive analysis of bank closure.” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 3(3), 272–299.
Peek, J. and Rosengren, E.S. (2005): “Unnatural selection: Perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in japan.” American Economic Review, 95(4), 1144–1166.
Rajan, R.G. (1994): “Why bank credit policies fluctuate: A theory and some evidence.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 399–441.
Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. (1998): “Financial dependence and growth.” American Economic Review, 88(3), 559–586.
Stever, R. and Wilcox, J.A. (2007): “Regulatory discretion and banks’ pursuit of “safety in similarity”.” BIS Working Papers 235, Bank for International Settlements.
Język Polski
English
